ABSTRACT
I argued in the last chapter that while Kierkegaard's deliberations on subjectivity and truth seem to prefigure hyper-existentialism, in fact they undermine its assumptions and show its incoherence, hi particular, with regard to Kierkegaard's positive moral argument, I argued that his thesis that 'Subjectivity is Untruth' impugns the supposed autarky and lack of social conscience characteristic of the Nietzschean self. Accordingly, I maintained that the Kierkegaardian conception of existential truth constitutes a proleptic critique of its Nietzschean rival. What this leaves undecided, however, is how both philosophers envisage the successful communication of their rival conceptions. This issue is peculiarly pressing, because - as will be seen - there is much in their respective works to suggest a deep scepticism regarding the possibility of such communication. It will be the argument of this chapter that Nietzsche's scepticism on this matter runs deeper than Kierkegaard's, and that whereas Nietzsche's eventual position is in danger of precluding successful ethical communication, Kierkegaard's account constitutes a sophisticated analysis of the conditions of its possibility.
