ABSTRACT
On the face of it, one obvious way of showing that a first being has intellect and will is by arguing from the apparent status of intellect and will – and indeed wisdom and love – as pure perfections. 1 As we might expect, Scotus does not accept this inference. As we saw in chapter 3, Scotus holds that the correct understanding of a pure perfection is one that is better than anything incompatible with it. But he believes it to be hard to tell whether something is a pure perfection unless such a property is simply better for everything. So Scotus’s own arguments for the first being’s intellect and will use rather different insights. They turn on the fact that the first being’s activity is directive and contingent. Scotus believes that these activities of the will require intellect: if the first being is to direct things to their ends, he must know their ends, and if his activity is contingent he must be able to choose between known options. 2 Scotus offers a few brief arguments for the directive role of the first cause, of which the most extensive is this:
[1]
The first efficient cause directs its effect to a goal. Therefore, [it does so] either
naturally or by loving it. But not in the first way, because something lacking
knowledge directs nothing other than in virtue of something that knows, for the first
ordering belongs to the wise. The first [efficient cause] does not direct in virtue of
anything [else], just as it does not cause [in virtue of anything else]. 3
