ABSTRACT
This chapter proposes a new approach to a persistent and difficult problem of antitrust policy. The problem is: What rules and remedies are necessary to prevent supracompetitive prices in oligopolies, markets in which a few sellers account for most of the output? The interdependence theory of oligopoly that underlies the view, in treating explicit and tacit collusion dichotomously, has obscured the similarities between the two kinds of anticompetitive behavior. At the heart of Turner's analysis is the theory of oligopolistic interdependence. The theory will be examined critically at a later point; for now, a brief summary will suffice. Turner's decisive argument is that there is no effective remedy, fairly to be implied from Section 1 of the Sherman Act, against oligopolistic interdependence. The biggest problem in applying Section r of the Sherman Act to tacit collusion is that of proof: How can the existence of noncompetitive pricing are established without any proof of acts of agreement, implementation, or enforcement?
