ABSTRACT

How serious was the destruction suffered during the Spanish civil war? There is some dispute among scholars about the extent of the devastation. Many researchers have found that ‘economic’ destruction, that is, the destruction of physical capital equipment, was less extensive than the Franco regime reported, whereas the main damage may have been inflicted upon human capital and other less tangible assets, such as organization and the transportation system (Nu´n´ez, 2001; Ros Hombravella, 1973; Catala´n, 1995, pp. 41-59). The Franco regime was interested in exaggerating the physical damage caused by the war in order to justify the very low living standards prevailing during the post-war years. This was a period which – unfortunately for the average Spaniard – coincided with the Second World War and with the most extreme autarkic (self-sufficient) policies of the Franco regime. As a result of the war in Europe and Spain’s alliance or proximity to the Axis powers, the country was deprived of the bulk of capital imports that were needed for reconstruction. Regarding casualties, the most reliable estimates show that those of the

Spanish civil war were rather on the low side compared to those of the main combatants in the Second World War: deaths were around 1.5 per cent of the population, with a substantial fraction of them due to repression after the war.2 As to agriculture, the leading specialist Barciela has stated that ‘the war, contrary to what was stated by the Francoist propaganda, had no catastrophic effects on agriculture’. According to this author, the fall in wheat output during the war and thereafter was due to grievous mistakes in economic policy, not to physical destruction (Barciela, 1987, p. 258). At factories and mines as well, the destruction was not very serious, except in cases when factories were located inside towns and cities. It was the centres of cities and the military installations that were bombarded rather than the

outskirts, where most of the industries were located. An indication of the relatively small damage suffered by factories is the surprising fact that, according to Tafunell, business profits during the war never fell below 50 per cent of their 1930 level.3