ABSTRACT
Many of the people in agriculture, animal research, or other animal-using areas whose activities have been criticized on grounds designated as "animal rights" believe such criticism is irrational, misguided, misplaced, sentimental, or misanthropic. For this reason, the response by animal users to such attacks has often been to point out the patent benefits that accrue to human society by virtue of social adherence to the allegedly objectional practices. This chapter shows how does one demonstrate that a social practice, widely accepted and demonstrably profitable or convenient—be it child labor, the barring of women from certain professions, or the raising of animals under intensive confinement—is morally problematic? It argues that the consensus ethic for humans protects certain aspects of human nature deemed to be essential to the human telos, shielding them from infringement by the majority and by the general welfare. The chapter also shows that the notion of animal rights is implicit in our consensus social ethics.
