ABSTRACT
In order to justify his epistemology of realism, Madhvacarya relies on a variety of cognitive apparatus and mechanisms. His account includes unavoidable presuppositions that also correlate with his ontology, soteriology and eschatology. This chapter introduces readers to this system, which includes his theories about valid knowledge, the instruments of valid knowledge via logical discourse and the tools by which we construct cognitions. Madhvacarya holds that yogi-jnana is the knowledge obtained by yogis, contemplative ascetics, after meditating on Viuou. Madhvacarya states that pratyaksa, perception, is comprised of two types of cognitive apparatus: the indriyas, six physical sense organs, and the saksi, the internal witness. Scholars both in South Asia as well as in the West have long speculated about the epistemological status of memory. The saksi, internal witness, is the most important component of Madhvacarya’s epistemology.
