ABSTRACT
As air and ground forces become increasingly interdependent, it may be necessary to begin by emphasizing the fact that airpower applied appropriately can compensate for risk on the ground but cannot always save a bad plan. The aforementioned use of organic rotary-wing Army aviation in lieu of more survivable and capable fixed-wing air component assets against Saddam’s Republican Guard in 2003 demonstrated the criticality of ensuring that such planning fully involve operationally savvy air and ground planners. Analysis of the planning for Operation Anaconda serves as further reminder that, in the Twenty-first century, ground operations planned independently of air component representation are fraught with danger. The fact that airpower came to the rescue in the Shah-i-Kot Valley may have reinforced a lingering perception among some Soldiers that the CAS “911 force” can salvage even the most dire, self-induced emergencies. Such a belief could court disaster in the resource-constrained, interdependent environment confronting joint forces in the new century. An Operation Anaconda planned jointly from the beginning, on the other hand, may have integrated air and ground operations and featured the application of airpower in ways similar to the
concepts furthered in this study. Fully including imbedded air planners in a similar manner during OIF planning may have led to far greater success and fewer losses during March 2003 attacks on the Iraqi Medina Division as well.
