The Metaphysics of Evil in Plotinus: Problems and Solutions

Plotinus’ theory of evil is one of the most contested areas in his philosophy. This theory was generally rejected by his philosophical heirs in Late Antiquity, probably by Iamblichus, certainly and repeatedly by Proclus, and in modern scholarship it has been the subject of controversy for over a century. ¹ In the modern debate Denis O’Brien’s contributions are of exceptional importance. He has shown in particular that problems which we might find in Plotinus’ theory of evil can be solved within the framework of an interpretation of an acuity and sensitivity sufficient to do justice to Plotinus’ thought. ² However, there remain difficulties, I have suggested, in Plotinus’ views about evil, difficulties which resist solution. ³ With the purpose—of which Denis would, I think, approve—of defending Plotinus, Christian Schiffer has proposed solutions to these difficulties. ⁴ In this paper, which I offer to Denis as a modest palinode, I would like to show that Schäfer’s proposals will not suffice, and that other, more satisfactory solutions can be found. The problems which I wish to discuss here have to do with what might be described as the metaphysics of evil in Plotinus. They arise in particular, on the one hand, (I) from a passage in Ennead I. 8 chapter 7, where Plotinus argues that evil necessarily exists, and, on the other hand, (II) from part of Proclus’ criticism of Plotinus in his De malorum subsistentia.