ABSTRACT
Apart from the acceleration of the industry's restructuring the most significant consequence of the 1984-85 dispute was the founding the UDM. Not since the aftermath of the General Strike had there been two national organisations for mineworkers and as in the 1930s, the UDM was largely confined to the Nottinghamshire coalfield. British Coal smoothed the UDM's path but despite their best efforts the NUM remained the largest union for production workers in the industry. The UDM was the product of the failure of the 1944 Rulebook to manage effectively the tensions in the industry and union after 1972-74 and it represented a tradition integral to NUM politics, a tradition as legitimate as any other. The fraught circumstances of 1984-85 plunged the NUM into a crisis beyond the capacities of the 1944 Rulebook to resolve because presumptions of compromise and solidarity were central to the Rulebook. The framers of the 1944 Rulebook believed that unity would be secured through a complex consensus building process sensitive to the unstable balance between Area and National Union interests. In 1984-85 compromise and solidarity were in short supply and the issue precipitating the conflict - colliery closures - encouraged fragmentation. The UDM saw itself as the true inheritor of the NUM's traditions, the NUM saw the UDM as a bosses' union. The UDM was speedily integrated into the coal industry's institutions. The NUM responded with a policy of absolute nonrecognition and rejection, refusing to participate in any forum in which UDM representatives were present. Though understandable this policy exacerbated the NUM's marginalisation and fragmentation.
