ABSTRACT
This chapter offers an empirical test of the strength of the decades-old "One China" principle as a bilateral institution. It examines the extent to which Taipei can be said to have formed a "united front" with Beijing concerning China's territorial and demarcation disputes in the East and South China Seas under the "One China" institution. The chapter demonstrates that Taiwan's inconsistent participation in China's maritime disputes can be understood as a mixed product of its geopolitical considerations shaped by postcolonial conditions. It looks at how Taiwan has responded to the Sino-Japanese row over a collision incident near the Senkaku Islands and their subsequent "nationalization" and to the rising tensions in the South China Sea since the Scarborough Shoal standoff. China has been Taiwan's top trading partner and largest source of trade surplus, and Taipei and Beijing have concluded dozens of agreements to facilitate their functional cooperation in terms of freer movements of personnel, goods, services, and capital across the Strait.
