ABSTRACT
This chapter provides the grounds for identifying Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy of rational action with Immanuel Kant's by reconstructing Hegel's interpretation of Kant's practical philosophy. Like Hegel, Kant combines universalist elements with a genuine concern with individuality while Aristotle is best described as an all-the-way-down universalist. The chapter describes Hegel's account of rational agency as a modified, structural continuation of Kant's moral theory. It shows that Hegel's metaphysics of rational agency are based on his general metaphysics of "the concept". The chapter examines Hegel's own philosophical taxonomy. This entails a conclusion against some currently influential interpretations: Hegel is neither a naturalist nor a realist nor a subjective idealist nor a spiritualist. For Hegel's Aristotle, "individuality" is always substance's universality in disguise so that individuality can be reduced to universality. Despite Hegel's rejection of the consciousness-based perspective characteristic of transcendental idealism, his absolute idealism is decidedly post-Kantian.
