ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al, distinguishes between two B-theoretic responses to the A-theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. It argues for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. The chapter suggests that the deflationary view can provide support for veridicalism. In saying that the content of temporal experience is partly A-theoretic, the veridicalist would be claiming that our indirect awareness of time over longer time scales is characterized by a tendency towards a false belief in passage. B-theorists can take the explanation appropriate to cases of illusory motion perception and apply it, with very few changes, to the pervasive illusion of passage. The B-theory has two components. First, all times and/or events exist. And second, there is a complete tenseless description of temporal reality.
