Administrative Reform—II

Another administrative reform which has now become a burning question is the separation of the judicial from the executive service. Under existing arrangements the district magistrate is at one and the same time the head of the police and the head of the magistracy, and it is his duty to watch the police investigation of the more important cases, to instruct investigating officers, to read police reports and papers as they come in, and finally to decide whether a case should or should not be sent up for trial before himself or one of his subordinates. He is also in a position to exercise control over the trial of these cases by his subordinates. I cannot imagine that serious doubt can be felt by anyone who is acquainted with the practical 153administration of justice in India that the combination of executive and judicial functions in the same person does actually lead to practical abuse. It is a matter of universal knowledge that subordinate magistrates, whose position and promotion are dependent on the district magistrate, cannot, in such circumstances, discharge their judicial duties with that degree of independence which ought to characterise a court of justice. To furnish evidence of this would be an easy task. Mr Monomohun Ghose’s famous twenty cases ¹ are typical of others, ² and the 154experience of every judge, magistrate, and counsel could add to their number, but as they stand they are enough to show that mischief has resulted. It must be remembered also that a very small proportion of cases in which interference has been exercised comes to notice, for discreet officers will always keep their interference and control in the background. The fact remains that, however indirectly the power may be exercised, the union of police prosecutor and judge in the same hands leads to results which 155are as objectionable in practice as they are anomalous in theory.