ABSTRACT
This chapter is a continuation of the former one and aims to examine, using original data gathered from the provincial Supreme Courts, the factors that account for the judicial instability at that level since 1983. The main findings are that party loyalties are determinants of the stability of the justice on the bench and that local executives have been able to systematically manipulate the composition of the courts by undermining the independence of the judiciary and the stability of the justices. Descriptive statistics reveal that provincial justices have been on average more unstable than the justices from the National Supreme Court both before 1983 and afterwards. Because at the subnational level there is significant heterogeneity, it was possible to elucidate more clearly how political factors matter under different scenarios. In those provinces with a single-party system (where the same political party has ruled since 1983), governors would not trust justices appointed by a governor from a different political faction. Intra-party competition plays a central role in those provinces to account for judicial instability. However, in provinces with a multi-party system, governors do not trust justices appointed by a governor from a different political party as well as from a different political faction.
