ABSTRACT
Wittgenstein is typically viewed as concerned with one particular variety of scientism: scientism understood as the threat posed by application of scientific practices to areas of our lives in which they do not belong. With this understanding of Wittgenstein's approach to science in place, his concern over scientism is presented as the concern that scientific approach should not be extended to areas of our lives in which it does not belong. Wittgenstein's discussion of the principles of the natural sciences casts serious doubts on an assumption present in much of the literature: the assumption that in the Tractatus, if a proposition is neither senseful nor senseless, it must be automatically nonsensical. The Tractatus' discussion of scientific principles suggests that this misrepresents Wittgenstein's position. Scientism distorts our understanding of science, just as it distorts our other practices. In this respect, Wittgenstein is as concerned with scientism as a threat from science as he is with scientism as a threat to science.
