ABSTRACT
Recent research into the nature of mathematical cognition arguably suggests that humans and other animals possess a capacity for numerical perception. However, this seems to conflict with both traditional views about mathematical entities and traditional accounts of perception. As suggested by Kitcher, the ecological theory of perception can provide an account of our perceptual access to numerical content, according to which we perceive number by perceiving affordances for enumerative activity. However, Kitcher’s account needs updating to accommodate recent empirical evidence by providing a more fine-grained notion of enumerative activity in terms of sequential spatial attention. Given the radical metaphysical implications of the ecological approach to perception, this account of our access to number has the potential to have a significant impact on traditional debates in the philosophy of mathematics. Furthermore, the potential for a contemporary theory of perception to impact upon traditional debates in the philosophy of mathematics demonstrates the need for naturalistically inclined philosophers of mathematics to look beyond the study of mathematical cognition and be cognizant of wider developments in the sciences of the mind.
