ABSTRACT
This chapter explains Hume's and Smith's theories of empathy in their broader views on cognition and imagination, clarifying the different foci of empathy, the role of the imagination, and the unique evaluative dimension in Smithian empathy. It explores how empathy lies at the foundation of moral motivation, clarifying how the differences between Humean and Smithian empathy explain differences in their conclusions about the nature and limitations of moral motivation. The chapter shows how both Hume and Smith construct privileged points of view to reconcile the impartial demands of moral judgment with the potential partialities of empathy. It discusses the role of empathy in moral judgment differs from its role in moral motivation, with resources being available in the former case that are explicitly rejected in the latter. The empathy can be partial, and given that moral judgment presupposes a degree of impartiality, both acknowledge that it is useful and important to us to overcome these natural tendencies.
