ABSTRACT
This chapter begins by briefly outlining some of the ways in which moral philosophers and others have understood empathy and the claims they have made for its moral importance. It discusses the cases of autism and psychopathy. The chapter suggests against critics that though the underlying causes differ, these two populations are each impaired at the kind of identifying empathy that has been argued to be fundamental to the development of moral concern and to the recognition of the moral status of other persons. There are a variety of ways in which empathy might play an important or essential role in morality. It might be developmentally essential to moral agency. The chapter draws upon interviews and writings from alexithymic individuals with and without a diagnosis of autism. In a study where individuals with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder judged the moral acceptability of emotion-evoking statements, and identified the emotion evoked, alexithymia in non-autistic individuals predicted atypical moral judgment.
