ABSTRACT
The March 18, 2000, direct presidential election in the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan was definitely a watershed event, as it dislodged the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party or KMT) from political power after half a century of uninterrupted rule, and set in motion a new round of party realignment. A less noticeable but equally significant result of this milestone election was that it revived Taiwan's three-party system and contradicted the prediction of "Duverger's law." A single-member district election, according to Duverger, 1 is conducive to the making of a two-party system. Rational voters tend to choose between the incumbent and the most viable challenger, often from the government party and the main opposition party, rather than waste votes on candidates from third parties. Where district magnitude (M) is larger than one, the number of parties is still expected to be M plus one. 2 Yet, the case of newly democratized Taiwan often presents a non-Duvergerian equilibrium in its executive elections (where M = 1), enhancing rather than undermining the third party. This past election epitomized such an outcome.
