ABSTRACT

Postmodernists, critical theorists, and constructivists have not wrought the intellectual apocalypse in social science that some feared. Instead, a middle ground has gradually emerged on which, to be sure, skirmishes about the nature of social science continue (Adler 1997; Checkel 1998). This book is a product of those skirmishes, and seeks for itself a place on that middle ground. That its contributors often comment self-consciously on this effort to situate constructivism with respect to other approaches to international relations, and rule-oriented constructivism with respect to other constructivisms, gives some indication of the significance they attach to scholars’ efforts to police or “discipline” what passes for knowledge. 1 Perhaps this conviction, that science (social science, in this case) is an ethical as well as explanatory process, reflects the extent to which constructivists take normativity seriously. 2 This chapter will argue that they are right to do so. The value of constructivist research is increased rather than diminished by efforts to clarify its own normative purpose and the values to which it speaks.