ABSTRACT
In the late 1950s and 1960s, indeed around the same time as the nuclear tests in the Sahara, the signs of а profound transformation in France's internal and external situation reached critical mass. For а number of years before de Gaulle's return to оfБсе, there had Ьееп unmistakable evidence of а vigorous economic and demographic revitalisation. But the succession of colonial crises and the persistence of ап ineffectual and, to its critics, outmoded political system diminished the impact of these есо nomic achievements. Analyses written in the 1950s more often than not portrayed the irrefutable postwar successes within а framework of соп tinuing overall decline. 2 This changed after 1958, partly as а result of the accumulation of good economic news (in the early Fifth Republic accelerating growth rates were accompanied Ьу expanding foreign trade, especially with European Economic Community partners, and rising investment rates), part1y as а result of the successful transition to а more presidential style of government, and partly because of the gradual resolution of colonial problems. The whole bias of interpretation switched in these years. Instead of diagnosing malaise, observers were now chiefly соп cerned with explaining а postwar miracle, or rather two miracles. Опе was the emergence of а more industrialised and urbanised, more growth-and consumption-orientated, more efficient1y governed, in short more modern,
nation. The other was ап external miracle, involving reconciliation with Сегтапу and Italy, liberation [гот ever-present anxieties about attack [гот across the Rhine and [гот the self-imposed burden of colonial myths, and revitalisation of the nation's military capacities and international prestige.
