ABSTRACT
This study explores the micro-level determinants of migration in Afghanistan. Contrary to the bulk of academic work, which takes a revealed preferences approach and looks exclusively at migration behaviour, our analysis takes into consideration stated preferences utilising migration intentions. The reasons are two-fold: first, our data allow for a more robust analysis of intentions rather than behaviour; and second, migration intentions are not likely plagued by an endogeneity problem as is migration behaviour allowing for causal inference. While there may be instinctive doubt as to whether intentions approximate actual behaviour, a body of literature suggests plans to migrate are in fact a good, albeit imperfect, predictor of future migration behaviour (Gardner et al., 1985; De Jong, 2000; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008; Creighton, 2013). Nonetheless, our goal is not to argue whether intentions do robustly predict actual migration behaviour, but to investigate the drivers of those intentions in their own right. The reasons why an individual chooses to migrate are wide ranging
and cut across a broad spectrum of economic, social, cultural and political lines of explanation. Traditionally, movement has been understood to be caused by differences between locales in certain economic-related factors, including employment and wages. In an insecure environment, much like Afghanistan, however, where the line between voluntary and involuntary movement is blurred, it seems sensible to avoid presupposing that migration is strictly economic in nature. With this in mind, we consider the issue through the broader lens of household vulnerability, a measure which
incorporates a range of socio-economic factors allowing for a more comprehensive analysis. In our model, vulnerability is the result of two factors: the high uncer-
tainty of a detrimental shock occurring and the low resilience to cope if that shock happens to materialise. Therefore, vulnerability is caused by the combination of exposure to risk (high uncertainty) and lack of entitlements (low resilience). We follow the conceptual framework put forth by Ahmed and Gassmann (2009; 2010), which understands vulnerability in a post-conflict setting to be caused by functioning losses within four principal dimensions: (1) human security; (2) exchange freedom; (3) social capital; and (4) access. By classifying losses along these four dimensions, we are able to identify specific indicators within each allowing for measurement. With this conceptual and practical framework at hand, the research
question to be answered is: does vulnerability influence migration intentions, and more specifically which vulnerability-related factors are associated with concrete plans to migrate? The analysis, therefore, is a two-step process. We first profile household vulnerability using individual indicators of deprivation defined along four dimensions both in a dimensional and multidimensional fashion, and then perform a regression analysis estimating the influence on migration intentions. Afghanistan makes for an interesting case study for any number of rea-
sons, but particularly due to the migration-related trends over the last decade. Prior to the fall of the Taliban in 2001, a substantial portion of the Afghan population resided abroad as refugees, mostly in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Since then, however, the country has witnessed a massive return from abroad, 5.7 million people by UNHCR accounts, due in part to the perception that support from the international community would foster in an era of enhanced security as well as a more robust political and economic environment. While progress has been made in certain aspects of everyday life, overall vulnerability remains stubbornly high. The most recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment for Afghanistan (NRVA) for 2007-2008 estimated some 9 million people, or 36 per cent of the population, living in absolute poverty without the ability to meet his or her basic needs (MRRD and CSO, 2009).1Add to this picture the current withdrawal of foreign troops from the country and it should come as no surprise that many Afghans, including those who have only recently returned, once again entertain the possibility of moving abroad. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We begin by high-
lighting the theoretical foundation used for understanding the determinants of migration. The following section, then, provides a working definition of
vulnerability and an outline of our measurement criteria, followed by a description of the empirical model used in the regression analysis. The next section goes on to offer a brief review of migration trends in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, as well as an overview of our sample. We then present both descriptive and empirical results, before concluding in the last section.
