ABSTRACT
Given the dominance of statute over case law, the interest group or rent-seeking theories reviewed in chapter 3 should apply to civil law (especially French law). However, we have already identifi ed several caveats with this line of reasoning. The pro-market bias of the common law (the idea of some Hayekian bottom-up effi ciencies in the English legal system and top-down ineffi ciencies in the French legal system) might be an important argument, but the existence of some antimarket bias in French law is debatable.1 It could be that traditional French legal scholarship has been less concerned with effi ciency arguments. However, the lack of interest exhibited by French legal scholars concerning pro-market legal policies does not constitute strong evidence that French law itself is contrary to effi ciency.2 The lack of inclination for effi ciency exhibited by French legal scholars has little bearing for the effi ciency of French law.3
