ABSTRACT
CONTENTS 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 7.2 Touchscreen DREs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.2.1 Diebold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 7.2.2 Top to Bottom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 7.2.3 The Test of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 7.2.4 Around the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.3 Internet Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 7.3.1 The Washington, D.C., Internet Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 7.3.2 Estonia’s Internet Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 7.3.3 The New South Wales iVote System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.1 Introduction Many democracies rely on e-voting systems for binding elections, whether for inperson voting at poll sites or for remote voting over the Internet. (See Ch. 3 for an overview of the current state of e-voting worldwide.) Yet in practically every case where a fielded e-voting system has been publicly scrutinized by capable independent security experts, it has turned out to have serious vulnerabilities with the potential to
secret This highlights some of the most significant results from these studies and attempts to explain why real-world e-voting security failures are so widespread. It focuses on two classes of systems: poll-site DREs (Section 7.2) and online voting (Section 7.3).
