ABSTRACT
However, Daniels recognises that it is not sufficient to feel this as an injustice. Some rational argument must be given to show that access to medical care is a right, denial of which constitutes an injustice. He attempts to provide such an argument, based on Rawls's theory of justice, while accepting that Rawls's view, in its original form, has no particular relevance to medical care. In particular, Rawls's list of 'primary goods at the disposition of society' includes only 'rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth' (to which 'self respect' is later added). Such other primary goods as 'health and vigour' are described as 'natural goods', in the sense that 'although their possession is influenced by the basic structure [of society], they are not so directly under its control' (see Rawls, 1973, p. 62). However, Daniels argues that health (or medical) care is a moral right because it is a fundamental hum an need, to which hum an beings as such are morally entitled. To call something a need, in this sense, Daniels contends, is to say that:
• it is objectively ascribable (that is, a need in this sense is different from what someone may happen to think of as such)
• it is objectively important (that is, is something which objectively plays some important role in hum an life) (Daniels, 1985, p. 25).
