ABSTRACT
This chapter (1) introduces three new classes of dynamic anonymous random network matching games (Transferrable Utility [TU] noncooperative repeated games in client-server networks and TU cooperative repeated games in P2P networks for which it is possible to calculate the payoffs of individual members/nodes), (2) introduces three new network-allocation mechanisms for sharing the benefits of P2P and client-server networks wherein the mechanism is embedded in the pricing formula that can optimize both consumer welfare and producer/distributor welfare, (3) develops pricing models that can minimize the firm’s piracy losses and simultaneously maximize revenue for the information producer under different assumptions regarding customer behavior and utility, (4) develops models of information-producing firms and content-distribution firms that sell differentiated digital products to customers who have heterogeneous online/offline search costs, and (5) develops conditions for optimal search and a stopping point in the file sharing network (without using stochastic calculus which has been shown to be deficient).
