ABSTRACT
In the Philosophical Investigations , Wittgenstein warns repeatedly against the dangers of misleading analogies ( irreführender Analogien ). They are, he believes, an important source of philosophical puzzlement, and if we are to avoid such puzzlement, we must make explicit the analogies that influence our thinking. He does not always use the term ‘analogy’ [‘ Analogie’ ] (PI §§90, 146, 420, 613) in such contexts. Expressions [ Ausdrücke ] (PI §356), pictures [ Bilder ] (PI §§115, 337, 352), comparisons [ Vergleiche ] (PI §73, 308), similes [ Gleichnisse ] (PI §112) and metaphors [ Metaphern ] (PI §356, 439) are all taken to have the power to mislead (this list is not exhaustive), but these terms are all intertwined, for the analogies that Wittgenstein has in mind are figurative analogies, not the formal ones that we find in logic and mathematics (e.g., 2:4::4:8) and not the prosaic literal comparisons that we make when we say that this grape varietal is like that grape varietal or that this piece of wood, like that piece of wood, is balsa and will therefore also float. The analogies that concern Wittgenstein suggest a likeness between two things that can be best captured by a metaphor or a simile or, as he likes to say, a picture, and when we give them linguistic expression, those expressions are likewise misleading in virtue of what they express.
