ABSTRACT
Introduction In the aftermath of a long period of strong economic growth, Japan emerged in the 1990s as the world’s largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Japan has since lost this leading position, but is still a major actor in development aid and a key member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC).2 Despite this fact, “the Japanese Way” of engaging in development assistance has frequently encountered criticism from within the ranks of the OECD (see e.g. OECD 2004). Tokyo has been accused of being too focused on its own economic and commercial objectives, at the expense of broader development goals such as poverty reduction and social development. Compared to other important donors, does Japan’s model of ODA, its principles, goals and instruments, really stand out? Is Japan, or has it ever been, “unique” in its approach to development aid? As an international actor, Japan displays certain characteristics similar to the European Union (EU). First, both Japan and the EU are uncontested “aid superpowers”. In 2014 Japan was the world’s fourth largest donor of ODA in gross terms among the members of the DAC (MOFA 2016, p. 251, chart IV-25). The EU often refers to itself as the world’s largest donor of ODA, adding the total provided by its 28 member states to the amount of ODA provided through EU institutions. In other words, by treating EU aid as “more than the sum of its parts” (European Commission 2015a, p. 3), the EU is undeniably the world’s leading donor. A second common feature is that both actors may be said to be in relative decline. In Europe the perception is widespread that the global centre of gravity is shifting, and that Europe’s power is gradually eroding. The global financial crisis and the concept of an “Asian Century” have without doubt strongly affected Europe’s self-confidence. The ongoing refugee crisis and the debate leading up to the UK’s vote to leave the EU have resulted in a strong process of introspection in order to overcome internal economic, political and securityrelated challenges. China’s increasing centrality as a major regional power lies at the heart of a “new Asian order” that has led to a relative decline in the power of
Japan. Impressive economic growth meant that China overtook Japan in 2010 as the world’s second largest economy. In addition, Japan has gone through a lasting period of economic recession, often referred to as the country’s “lost decades”, after the economic bubble burst in the early to mid-1990s. Economic decline undoubtedly influences development policies and aid flows, even if it does not necessarily affect public support for aid (see e.g. European Commission 2009). An important third point of similarity is that both Japan and the EU see themselves as “civilian powers”. Both actors aim to play a global role first and foremost by focusing on civilian and “soft” power, as opposed to military power. Civilian power is a concept most famously applied to Europe by François Duchêne in his seminal article (Duchêne 1973). The term denotes a state that emphasizes economic over military means, and attempts to promote international values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The concept therefore also includes a normative dimension. While the self-perception of the EU as a “normative power” has long been established, Japan has also increasingly promoted its normative ambitions in recent years, explicitly aiming to develop its international role as a “global civilian power” (see e.g. Prime Minister’s Commission 2000). Japan’s most recent ODA White Paper, for example, emphasizes respect for freedom, democracy and basic human rights as prime tools of nation building and development (MOFA 2016, pp. 80-82). This chapter examines the norm-setting rhetoric of the EU and Japan, and compares the main features of the development cooperation policies of both actors. The analysis focuses on how ODA is used as a strategic tool in foreign policy to increase regional and global presence. In particular, the chapter analyses how development policy is used not only to spread certain core values and strengthen soft power, but also to enhance diplomatic relations and promote economic, commercial and security-related interests. It seeks to clarify whether Japan’s own model is unique, or whether Japan has remained “more a niche player in development aid rather than a world leader” (Lancaster 2007, p. 110).
