ABSTRACT

Introduction This chapter addresses the meaning and significance of the Development Cooperation Charter (DCC), endorsed by the second administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in February 2015, in the context of the US-Japanese relationship (MOFA 2015b). According to Marie Söderberg (Chapter 1, this volume), the DCC “opens up opportunities for more cooperation between security and development”, including funding for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). Furthermore, Bart Gaens argues (Chapter 9) that Japan has been making the best strategic use of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) under the guidance of the new National Security Council (NSC), which was established in December 2013. Both authors highlight the important issue of the securitization of Japan’s ODA or development assistance. Given the importance of this trend, this chapter analyses the security aspects of the DCC. It argues that the DCC was a major response to the US “pivot to Asia” and is indicative of Japan’s strategy of strengthening the division of labour between the United States and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. In effect, the DCC commits Japan to non-military peacebuilding roles, including economic assistance, while at the same time fending off excessive pressure from the USA for Japan to take on a greater military burden. Many scholars have analysed Japan’s ODA from various perspectives. Some have focused on domestic decision-making processes to understand how Japan’s ODA is formulated (Higuchi 1991; Koppel and Orr 1993; Orr 1990; Rix 1993). Many have been highly critical of Japan’s ODA (Murai and ODA Chōsa Kenkyūkai 1989; Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA Shuzaihan 1990; Söderberg 2010; Sumi 1989). One controversial issue is whether Japan’s ODA has any clear national philosophy. Japan’s ODA has been criticized as ad hoc and uncoordinated, and for precipitating confusion in recipient countries (Kawata 1977;

Orr 1990; Rix 1980; Wright-Neville 1991). Meanwhile, others have praised Japan’s ODA (Hanabusa 1991; Kusano 1993), asserting that it has a clear guiding philosophy. This philosophy involves using ODA to gain economic benefits (Murai 1998; Tuman and Strand 2006), helping those who help themselves (Nishigaki, Shimomura and Tsuji 2004; Watanabe 1991 2005, p. 57), and achieving national economic security for Japan (Matsui 1983). It is important to understand the decision-making processes, value judgments, and philosophy behind Japan’s ODA. At the same time, ODA is an important diplomatic tool for Japan and, as Raymond Yamamoto discusses in Chapter 5, the securitization of ODA has been increasing. Hence, it is also necessary to analyse the relationship between Japan’s ODA and US policy – as the USA is Japan’s most important diplomatic and most senior security partner. Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr, Jr. (1993) argue that throughout the 1980s, Japanese officials made the most of US pressure on Japan to expand its ODA budget, as it provided Japan with an alternative to military burden-sharing in the US-Japan alliance. Koppel and Orr, however, insist that this does not explain the whole picture. Rather, they conclude that Japan’s ODA policy was the result not of US pressure, but of Japan’s substantial domestic economic, political, and cultural interests. Other scholars have claimed that external pressure has had no significant impact on the development of Japan’s ODA (Fujibayashi and Nagase 2002, p. 83; Murai 1998; Tuman and Strand 2006, p. 75). On the other hand, Motoki Takahashi and Masumi Owa (Chapter 2, this volume) suggest that the ambiguity of Japan’s ODA reflects the nature of a reactive state – a state that responds primarily to external pressure, especially that of the USA, but lacks an independent, proactive assistance policy. Söderberg (2010) also takes the effect of US pressure on Japan more seriously, claiming that the contribution of Japanese ODA to peacebuilding is just rhetoric and camouflage to resist US pressure to make a greater military contribution on the international stage. This chapter examines and expands upon Söderberg’s thesis by analysing the importance of the DCC in the context of US-Japanese security relations, in the light of which the Japanese contribution to peacebuilding may be seen as not just rhetoric, but a clever tactic to solidify the division of labour between the USA and Japan.