ABSTRACT
This chapter divides the 1969 U.S.–Japan official negotiations into three parts: the June, July, and September ministerial talks.1 First, it examines Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi’s trip to Washington, DC on June 2-5 (First Round), including the Nixon-Aichi talks and the Rogers-Aichi talks, which marked the launching of the official negotiations. While Japan requested the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Okinawa, the U.S. stressed the continuing significance of U.S. deterrent capabilities in East Asia. U.S. officials insisted on the need for confidential understandings; Japanese officials were reluctant to make any additional secret agreements. Second, it examines Secretary of State William Rogers’ trip to Tokyo on July 30-August 2 (Second Round), including the Sato-Rogers talks and the Rogers-Aichi talks, which clar ified both the emerging common ground and the remaining differences regarding Okinawa’s strategic role in East Asian regional security (especially the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and Indochina). Bureaucratic talks continued in August (in Tokyo between Ambassador Armin Meyer, the Deputy Chief of Mission in U.S. Embassy Tokyo Richard L. Sneider, Vice-Minister Nobuhiko Ushiba, and Director-General of American Affairs Bureau Fumihiko Togo; in Washington, DC between Undersecretary U. Alexis Johnson and Japanese Ambassador Takezo Shimoda). The principal focus of the bureaucratic talks was the question of free use of U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa for conventional combat operations in regional contingencies (particularly those involving Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina). During Aichi’s trip to Washington on September 14-17 (Third Round), the two sides concentrated on the continuing free use of U.S. bases in Okinawa for use during the Vietnam conflict. Bureaucratic talks in October led to the final preparations for the Nixon-Sato summit talks, occurring in November. U.S. officials sought to obtain confidential written assurances for the continuing unrestricted use of bases in Okinawa; Japanese officials provided verbal understanding of the conditions of U.S. bases in the post-reversion Okinawa. Finally, this chapter examines the Kissinger-Wakaizumi private exchanges from July to November, focusing on the Japanese demand for the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Okinawa and the U.S. military requirements for the confidential written guarantee regarding the re-entry of nuclear weapons into Okinawa during emergencies.
