ABSTRACT
T h e issue of the declaration on October 23rd and its reiteration on December 5th corresponded with important developments in the Mediterranean theatre of war operations.
At the end of October, when Hitler had abandoned the idea of invading the British Isles and was unable to begin the war against the Soviet Union so late in the year, he turned to the possibility of war operations in the Mediterranean.1 As long as he expected a victory over England Hitler did not pay much attention to the area where the Italians were supposed to operate. It was when the possibility of a direct invasion and destruction of her rival across the Channel began to decline that Germany began to elaborate plans to attack British positions in the Mediterranean. In the middle of October the German Naval Command considered that an offensive against Alexandria and the Suez Canal and the development of the situation in the Mediterranean in general, might determine the outcome of the war. What is more, the War Admiralty stressed that it was not sufficient to control the western part of that sea, but that strategic and economic considerations dictated the necessity of also dominating its eastern shores.2 Raeder is reported to have told Hitler as early as September 26th, that Suez must be taken with the active participation of German troops.3 The same opinion prevailed in the High Command of the land forces. Heusinger, Paulus and Gehlen thought that German participation in the Libyan campaign had to be concerted with the capture of Crete and with military operations in the direction of Bulgaria, Turkey and Syria ;4 that is with an advance on Suez from the north. And on November 2nd, 1940, General Haider composed a memorandum for Hitler in which he advocated this line of action.
