ABSTRACT
The results began to be felt by the end of 1941, when the victories of Britain’s land forces in the Western Desert were accompanied by serious naval defeats. The Italian Navy sank several enemy units, such as the aircraft-carrier Ark Royal and the warships Barham, Valiant and Queen Elizabeth-the last two in Alexandria harbour by human torpedoes. At the same time (December 10th) the British fleet suffered a painful defeat in the Far East. On December 18th and January 5th the Italian Naval Command sent a strong convoyprotecting force to North Africa, greatly reinforcing the Axis there, but this could not be continued for lack of fuel. The question of using Tunisian ports to equip the African troops now became important. On December 29th, 1941, Mussolini sent Hitler a letter pointing out that the convoy of transports to Africa involved so much oil that it had become impossible to supply that fuel to the African front even in the amounts which were indispensable for defensive operations. He stressed that it was not possible to plan an offensive without the assurance of bases in Tunisia. In the Duce’s opinion,
these bases had to be acquired by an understanding with Vichy or by force. 1 Hitler rejected the idea of an agreement with Vichy, because he did not wish to meet the conditions which would be presented by Petain, and he objected to using force for fear of the repercussions throughout French Africa. 2
Rommel launched a counter-offensive on January 21st and within a few days regained a good part of the terrain lost to Britain. But he failed to reach Tobruk. He took Mekhili and Temimi on February 5th and the front was consolidated on that line to the end of May 1942.
