ABSTRACT
This chapter concerns all readings that deny that Friedrich Nietzsche is a social constructivist about objects. Before turning to an examination of the non-constructivist readings of Nietzsche's corpus, it will be helpful to elaborate on the nature of constructivism. Commonsense realism falls short because Nietzsche prefers constructivism to objectivism. Constructivism is also easily compatible with the existence of commonsense entities. Object eliminativism fails because Nietzsche's fundamental ontology is consistent with the existence of constructed objects. Subject eliminativism should be rejected because Nietzsche does not deny the existence of subjects and objects, but only the existence of subjects and objects conceived as substances. Nietzsche also denies the Kantian requirement that unified subjects must exist in order for objects to exist. Unificationism is problematic, first, because Nietzsche holds that intrinsic properties do not constitute objecthood, and second, because Nietzsche's relational ontology renders constructing subjects necessary for objects to exist.
