ABSTRACT
The three eldest of Said bin Sultan’s sons, Thuwayni, Majid and Barghash, gave as little heed to their father’s apparent succession wishes as Said himself had to the arrangements made in Uman following his own father’s death in 1804. At first the circumstance of actual possession of the position of ruler, Thuwayni in Muscat and Majid in Zanzibar, awarded both a considerable tactical advantage. In Zanzibar Majid, buttressed with the assistance of Said’s supporters, along with the full backing of Hamerton, appeared initially to have secure command of the island. Both Barghash, then in Zanzibar but lacking any substantial organized following, and the distant Thuwayni, who had moreover to ensure his own position in Uman, clearly required additional time for preparing any effective challenge to Majid. But, as the months passed, important erosions occurred among the political factors which had aided Said bin Sultan in maintaining his mastery of Zanzibar. Atkins Hamerton, refusing to leave the island despite increasing bouts of illness, died in July 1857; since there was an interval of about a year in the arrival of his successor as British representative, Majid during this unsettled period was denied the vital support of his dynasty’s principal ally. Consequently, some of the island groupings, particularly the long-time rivals of the BuSaidi, the al Harthi, made ready in time-honoured Umani style to advance their own cause. Some modern British scholars, most recently John Gray, have explained
this Arab opposition as an inevitable reaction to the antislave trade policies of the BuSaidi. But since virtually all Arabs in Zanzibar opposed the British policies — even at heart the BuSaidi — this does not, in view of the long-standing factional rivalries among the islands’ Arab population, appear a realistic interpretation. The resulting threat to Majid was obvious. The principal al Harthi leader, Abdulla bin Salim, was a formidable foe, possessing extensive financial resources drawn from commerce and land holding; his armed retainers numbered almost 2,000. Already experienced in the political life of Zanzibar, Majid countered the potential danger by a careful policy designed to maintain the status quo: the al Harthi chieftan continued to be treated by the sultan in a manner befitting his rank, receiving an annual subsidy of $1,200, plus the right to pass his goods freely through the customs house.
