Beyond the Dichotomy of “Social Direct Perception” and “Simulation Theory”

The argument in this chapter is based on the assumption that the overcoming of a monolithic concept of empathy requires a closer look at both the social-ontological embedment of empathy and the intertwining of empathy and imagination. In order to develop this argument, Max Scheler’s contribution to the phenomenology of empathy is discussed. Besides considering his account of the direct perception of others, which has gained much resonance in current research, this chapter shows that Scheler’s major contribution consists in his intuition that forms of social cognition are intrinsically related to forms of society. On the basis of Scheler’s analysis, it is argued that the phenomenological theory of social understanding should go beyond a monolithic concept of empathy and that this requires a deeper understanding of both the social-ontological embedment of empathy and the role of imagination (in both its strong and weak forms) in empathy.