ABSTRACT
This chapter compares Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to intersubjectivity and sociality. For both thinkers, intersubjectivity is not as an ontological problem (the problem of other minds and their metaphysical inaccessibility). Rather, they aim at shedding light on how the experience of otherness is tied to meaningfulness, which has aesthetic and imaginative grounds. For both thinkers, what is primarily at stake is neither an epistemological nor an ontological question, but rather, the question concerning the formation of a “we-perspective,” which establishes a bond of sociability and is considered as the condition for constituting a possible community. Gemeinsinn and Übereinstimmung are the two aesthetic concepts that allow us to address the grounds and the formation of a “we-perspective.” These should not be understood as referring to already existing communities; they rather make up the conditions for anthropological communities.
