Introduction

This chapter sets out the conceptual groundwork for the book, beginning with a discussion of evidentialism. The book proceeds on the assumption that epistemic reasons—the kinds of reasons which make beliefs epistemically rational—consist of evidence, and it aims to answer two central questions: why do epistemic reasons consist of evidence? And why are epistemic reasons normative?

The chapter goes on to explain the internalist, accessibilist nature of evidence: a person’s evidence is provided by his or her accessible non-factive mental states. It also argues that when we are developing our account of epistemic reasons and justification, we should not worry about whether our account of epistemic justification is apt to be taken up as a condition in the analysis of knowledge.

The final substantive claim argued for in this chapter, before closing with a summary of the rest of the book, is that blamelessness entails permissibility. Two important arguments against that entailment are shown to fail. It then follows that if rationality is understood as blamelessness, and justification is understood as permissibility, then rationality and justification are equivalent.