ABSTRACT
This chapter defends the view that deontological terms of appraisal such as permissibility, impermissibility, praise, and blame are properly applicable to belief. The following argument aims to establish that deontological evaluations are not applicable to belief:
P1. If deontological terms of appraisal are applicable to an agent’s φ-ing, then it is under the agent’s direct voluntary control whether he or she φs (a strong version of ought-implies-can).
P2. It is never under a person’s direct voluntary control whether he or she has a given belief.
C. So deontological terms of appraisal are never applicable to beliefs.
The chapter responds to this argument by noting that belief has both active and passive aspects. The passive aspect of belief is a feeling, or disposition to feel that a proposition is true, or to feel confident in its truth. The active aspect of belief, what some people call acceptance, is a willingness to take a proposition up in one’s deliberations. This aspect of belief is under our direct voluntary control. The two aspects of belief normally go together, but they can come apart. When they do, deontological evaluations are properly applicable only to the active aspect of belief.
