ABSTRACT
The subject of this chapter is the instrumental conception of the nature of epistemic reasons and rationality. According to this view epistemic rationality is a species of instrumental rationality in the service of the achievement of a cognitive or epistemic goal which we all have or ought to have. The epistemic goal, although tricky to formulate precisely, at least involves the achievement of true beliefs and the avoidance of false ones.
This chapter explains five possible arguments for this instrumental conception. The first argument is that if true, the instrumental conception would explain why evidence is so important to the determination of the epistemic status of beliefs in clear cases of epistemic rationality and irrationality: evidence is what bears on the truth values of propositions, so believing in accord with the evidence is the appropriate way to achieve the epistemic goal. Other arguments can be constructed from epistemological naturalism; from meta-ethical normative reasons internalism; from the default, truth-centered way of doing epistemology; and from the desideratum of constructing a unified account of epistemic and practical rationality.
