ABSTRACT
The study of human decision-making has made great strides over the past several
decades: The normatively appealing, but descriptively lacking, axiomatic theories
of expected utility maximization (e.g. von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) were
successfully challenged, and gave way to more behaviorally inspired approaches,
such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992), regret theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982), and other variants (for reviews,
see Schoemaker, 1982; Starmer, 2000). Another major step forward has been the
development of dynamic theories, which attempt to capture, not just the output
of decision-making, but also the process of deliberation that ultimately leads to
observed choices (e.g. Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Usher &McClelland, 2004).
And there is no sign of slowing down: Even the past couple of years have witnessed
the birth of new decision-making theories (e.g. Bhatia, 2013; Dai & Busemeyer,
