ABSTRACT
Mr Bevin’s report to the Cabinet (No. 33) reflected the breadth and depth of his efforts in Washington and New York in the last few months of 1946, and his skill in dealing with a wide range of policy issues at the same time. But while his ministerial and official colleagues in London were appreciative of his efforts and generally supportive of his policies, these were not unchallenged on his return to London. A series of discussions with Mr Attlee over Christmas and the New Year, though conducted in friendly spirit, appeared to reveal some fundamental differences of opinion on the way forward for British policy in 1947. Writing to the Prime Minister on 1 January, for example, Mr Bevin protested against Cabinet plans to set a date for Indian independence, describing them as ‘defeatist’: ‘We appear to be trying to scuttle out of it, without dignity or plan.’ On the contrary, replied Mr Attlee, the policy was one of realism, not defeatism: ‘We are seeking to fulfil the pledges of this country with dignity and to avoid an ignominious scuttle.’1 The Foreign Secretary’s concern was based in part on the implications for other areas of strategic importance to Britain: ‘Not only is India going but Malaysia, Ceylon and the Middle East, with tremendous repercussions on the African territories.’ In the light of these discussions, and a series of memoranda on British strategic requirements, the Prime Minister addressed a minute to Mr Bevin on 5 January, reproduced here in the light of its implications for policy towards Russia, that seemed to question the whole basis of his policy. This document, and Mr Bevin’s reply printed as No. 37, represent what Mr Bevin’s biographer called the ‘fullest exchange between Attlee and Bevin on foreign and defence policy since the Labour government had been formed.2 Despite their differences, however, it was Mr Bevin’s views that prevailed in the formulation of foreign policy, with the full support of Mr Attlee; and a series of important ministerial meetings, taking place at the same time as their exchange of memoranda, shows the Cabinet’s solidarity on key issues. 1 Exchange of correspondence, 1-2 January 1947, FO 800/470. See Bullock, pp. 359-60. For detailed Cabinet discussions and negotiations regarding the timing and terms of independence for India at this period see N. Mansergh and P. Moon (eds.), The Transfer of Power 1942-47, Volume IX (London: HMSO, 1980). 2 Bullock, pp. 348-51.
No. 34
Minute from Mr Attlee to Mr Bevin, 5 January 1947 Top Secret M15/47 (FO 800/476)
Foreign Secretary
I have set down for the purpose of clearing my own mind some considerations which have occurred to me on reading the papers on our policy in the Near East.1 I enclose a copy in order to inform you of what is in my mind.
