ABSTRACT
In the previous section of this book there was little debate. I was more engaged in stating my position on some postures that are “topical” in the literature. Some of the articles reprinted here are getting down to cases. In my response to Freeman (Chapter 8) I address some of the effects of empiricists’ assumptions and suggest some of their consequences for debate. This is also true in my exchanges with Gould (Chapters 9–11); however, in the latter exchanges as well as those with Sackett (e.g., Chapters 14 and 16) other devices of argument not previously discussed raise their heads:
Argumentum ad Ignorantiam: an argument purporting to demonstrate a point or to persuade people, which avails itself of facts and reasons the falsity or inadequacy of which is not readily discerned, a misleading argument used in reliance on people’s ignorance. (Runes 1979:19)
