ABSTRACT
Smith prefaced his translation of three very important passages from the Rousseau's Second Discourse with a seemingly dismissive remark. This chapter explains what Rousseau is doing in presenting his thoughts here in this striking way. Rousseau's non-Aristotelian assumptions about self-knowledge lead to discussion of the connection between genealogical accounts, relativism, and problems of self-reference, and to observations about Rousseau's genealogical method in relation to several contemporary accounts of genealogy. The chapter examines salient features of Rousseau's genealogical form of narration to explain how the form and content of this discourse cohere. It revisits the question as to whether Rousseau's genealogy is subject to a self-reference problem and more broadly the metaphilosophical issue as to skeptical doubts about the rational foundation of his story. The chapter discusses differences and similarities between Smith's and Rousseau's views on the issues of genealogy, self-knowledge, the uses of historical investigation, and the practices or methods of philosophy.
