ABSTRACT
In this chapter, we'll consider other metaethical theories that, in one way or another, reject some of the basic distinctions that we previously used to classify the four main theoretical traditions in metaethics. I will group these remaining theories into three main categories. First, there are several theories offering a more nuanced answer to the question: are ethical thoughts cognitive states ("belief-like") or conative states ("desire-like")? There are a few different ways to respond to this question by arguing that it is a false dichotomy. Perhaps ethical thoughts have belief-like and desire-like aspects or components. Second, there's a theoretical tradition tracing back to Hobbes' political philosophy whereby facts about political legitimacy are said to be "constructed" rather than, so to speak, already out there to be discovered. This is related to a tradition in moral philosophy that construes ethical properties as defined in part by the way people would react to situations under certain specified circumstances. Recently, some metaethicists have tried to extend and combine these ideas to defend the view that there are, in a sense, ethical facts but they are, quite generally, constructed out of the reactions of people in particular situations rather than already out there to be discovered. Third, quite independently of metaethics, some philosophers have expressed skepticism about the common model of language that assumes, as the default view, that statements are attempted representations of reality. As we've seen, expressivists argue that ethical statements are not attempted representations of reality, but they tend to assume that's an exception to the general rule about assertoric language. However, rather than see the burden of proof on anti- representationalists about ethical statements, a more general antirepresentationalism in the philosophy of language might shift the burden of proof to representationalists. One of the main traditions in the philosophy of language is a view that explains meanings in terms of conceptual roles rather than representation. Here, we'll explore how it might provide some means for this burden-shifting move and its consequences for metaethics.
