ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the strongest competition to the objective list theory (OLT), mental statism. Mental statism holds that the sole bearers of intrinsic prudential value, the only things that intrinsically affect the value of a life for the one who lives it, are mental states. The chapter talks about the nature of mental statism and the species of its most popular genus, hedonism. It discusses the experience machine and argues that the experience machine gives additional reason to distinguish between welfare and the worth of a life. The chapter defends mental statism against a full suite of prominent objections that appear to decisively refute the theory: the deceived businessman objection, Nozick's Mongolian pornographer, Nagel's contented infant, Moore's beastialist, and Griffin's dying Freud. It also provides four arguments in support of mental statism: the argument from inverted false pleasures, the more goods, less happiness argument, the problem of changing desires, and the self-sacrifice argument.
