ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author gives attention to anti-reductive analyses and argues that two of the most prominent anti-reductive theories of causation fail. The author supplants them with what he believes is a better anti-reductive theory of causation, the full fundamentalist account. The author then shows how that account can overcome the so-called difficult cases involving symmetric overdetermination, preemption, and other scenarios by entering through David M. Armstrong's open door. Mechanisms are collections of concrete particulars or "organized collections of entities whose activities and interactions take place at some particular place and time". The plurality of interactions and activities in nature is determinative of the multifarious types of productive causation. The author concludes with some reflections on how his fundamentalist/anti-reductive account of causation relates to Jonathan Schaffer's theory of grounding. The author's account of natural causation is not Schaffer's theory of grounding. This is because natural causation has a richer nature than Schafferian grounding.
