ABSTRACT
Causal direction, like most other asymmetries, is ultimately grounded in a "third arrow" that is an asymmetry of physics. Physicalism is a common motivator of this brand of reductionism. When interpreting their own remarks, Price-Weslake stated, "hyperrealism entails that causal facts are underdetermined by all available non-causal evidence." If hyperrealism is true, then every member of the set of all causal facts is underdetermined by the set of "all available non-causal evidence." There are many other ways of achieving basic perceptual causal knowledge that are consistent with hyperrealism. Proper functionalism is not required. Debunking arguments are those that rob cognizers of their rationality. They do this by showing that a cognizer's belief fails somehow to be properly related to that which it is about. The connection in view is thought by some to be an alethic explanatory one. Reductionists should not appropriate epistemological objections to causal hyperrealism.
