ABSTRACT
Methodologically, the debate has been widely construed as taking place between Dreyfus' use of the existential phenomenology (especially Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Todes) and McDowell's synthesis of Aristotelian, Hegelian and Wittgensteinian motifs. Building on both McDowell and Dreyfus, Joe Rouse argues that we should recognize both that conceptual capacities are realized in discursive practices and that discursive practices are forms of embodied coping. McDowell avoids conflating these distinctions and strongly implies that sapience encompasses both theoria and praxis. Rouse's complex account of reasoning involves three claims that together weaken the contrast between the space of reasons and the space of motivations. The chapter suggests that building on Rouse's account in order to develop a contrast between sentient intentionality and sapient intentionality. It introduces three criticisms and three revisions to Rouse's general account in order to further weaken Dreyfus' dichotomy between the logical space of reasons and the logical space of motivations.
