Introduction

Modernization of the US nuclear arsenal is one of the most urgent questions of policy and strategy in the national security environment of the twenty-first century. The need for modernization of US strategic nuclear forces is not only about fielding capability and budgets, or roles and missions, although these are important. Strategic nuclear force modernization also impacts upon the ability of the United States to exert appropriate international leadership, including deterrence of adversaries, assurance of allies, and the preservation of deterrence and arms race stability. The preservation of nuclear deterrence and arms race stability rests on a paradox. Once fired in anger, nuclear weapons would cause unprecedented destruction in a short time. The lethality of nuclear weapons, however, gives them their suasion as instruments of deterrence. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union ushered in new requirements for nuclear deterrence, tailored to a wider post-Cold War environment of possible threats. Instead of a singular US and NATO focus on deterring the former Soviet Union, the US now requires forces with the flexibility to deal with threats from rogue states outside Europe, from non-state actors, and from “failed states” in possession of nuclear weapons or fissile materials. The US strategic nuclear deterrent, including land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range heavy bombers, remains as singularly important as it was in the previous century. It provides the top cover of military capability that protects the United States and its allies against nuclear attack or blackmail, and it enables the US as a leader in the field of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The United States takes seriously its responsibility for leadership in nuclear arms control. President Barack Obama acknowledged at the outset of his administration that his further objective of nuclear abolition would probably not be achieved in his lifetime, if ever. Therefore, according to his nuclear policy guidance, the US must maintain a nuclear deterrent that is second to none as long as nuclear weapons exist and are deployed by other states. Nevertheless, the Obama administration has sought to diminish the US dependency on nuclear weapons for dealing with non-nuclear threats. This objective must be tempered by awareness that nuclear and non-nuclear forces have certain overlapping support capabilities and taskings (for example, the US bomber force carries out both nuclear

and conventional long-range missions). In addition, both nuclear and conventional forces depend on cyber capabilities that are becoming increasingly important for deterrence and defense missions. Even among those who favor modernization of the US strategic nuclear triad, there is some disagreement about the preferred mix of weapons systems and supporting capabilities necessary to fulfill US policy and mission requirements. For example, some argue that the US no longer needs three different “legs” or kinds of intercontinental delivery systems. One or more of the legs of the triad could be dispensed with, saving costs for modernization without actually jeopardizing US security. Others contend, to the contrary, that the strategic nuclear triad of land-and sea-based missiles and long-range bombers create a benign redundancy that helps to forestall prospective attackers. Any attacker would have to assume his ability to neutralize all three components of the US retaliatory force in order to limit damage to “acceptable” levels. Such an attack would be unlikely because each of the three legs of the nuclear triad has unique properties: ICBMs are most ready for prompt launch; SLBMs are the most first strike survivable platforms; and bombers allow policymakers the flexibility to send signals of nuclear resolve without making an irrevocable commitment to nuclear first strike or retaliation. The future credibility of US nuclear forces will depend in part on the supporting infrastructure, including nuclear weapons laboratories, contractors, and idea factories inside and outside government. In this regard, there was much neglect during the first two decades after the end of the Cold War. Secretary of Defense Robert gates’s dismissal of the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force in 2007, following an embarrassing lapse in security protocols for the transport of nuclear weapons, was a signature moment of revelation about a collective government and societal nuclear neglect. The “action” was in asymmetrical conflicts, including terrorism and unconventional warfare: government and think tank analysis followed the yellow brick road that bypassed the continuing need for nuclear weapons modernization and nuclear-related scientific knowhow. As a result, there is now a requirement, not only for a “linear” modernization of nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, but for a broader based assessment of the role of nuclear forces in relation to other and emerging capabilities. For example, the development of Prompt global Strike systems for long-range delivery of precision conventional weapons, including by platforms formerly dedicated exclusively to nuclear forces, creates a new offensive mix of capabilities relative to potential missions. Along with this, further research and development as well as deployment of US and allied NATO ballistic missile defenses (BMD) must factor into the assessment of US capabilities relative to those of other states. Third, the cyber realm will impose a discipline and a chaos of its own on nuclear modernization and force planning. Future planning scenarios will have to take into account the possibility of cyber-attacks either prior to an outbreak of kinetic war or during it. National military strength and the effectiveness of preferred US military strategies are ultimately dependent on the support of the American people. In this

regard, civilian policymakers, military leaders, and academics, among others, have a responsibility to provide research and analysis on important public policy issues related to nuclear weapons, including nuclear force modernization, deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation. The present volume brings together academic and military collaborators in order to address these issues within the context of US Air Force current and future requirements and challenges. As the arm of service responsible for two of the three component delivery systems of the US strategic nuclear triad, the Air Force must operationalize and implement the wishes of policymakers, according to prevailing defense guidance and by using professional military judgment. This study is offered as a modest contribution toward the creation of an optimal policy-strategy linkage with respect to future US strategic nuclear forces and their assigned missions of deterrence and dissuasion of adversaries, reassurance of allies and others, and vital supports for nuclear arms control and cooperative threat reduction among nations.