ABSTRACT
Introduction Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has struggled to clearly articulate the purpose of its nuclear forces. Unprecedented reductions in its nuclear arsenal, restraints on nuclear weapons testing and new designs, and a shift in focus to more likely, albeit less dangerous, national security problems led to a physical and human capital deterioration within the nuclear weapons enterprise. An intellectual confusion regarding the purpose of nuclear weapons is mirrored in budgeting for the enterprise and associated defense programs. Federal officials and nuclear enterprise analysts do not agree on how much the US is actually spending on nuclear forces, making a straightforward analysis of nuclear enterprise-related expenditures less accurate than desired. This creates an opportunity to inflate nuclear weapons costs to advance a political agenda-while confusing the public concerning the cost of the arsenal. With the nuclear weapons budget jointly prepared by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense (DoD), it is understandable that there is some confusion as to the total cost of nuclear weapons-related activities. In its current form, the process is guided by the president’s priorities (usually set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review [NPR]), which includes a role for the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the White House, and Congress. The responsibility for determining expenditures is jointly shared by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. In short, the process for determining fiscal expenditures on the nuclear enterprise is complex and difficult to follow. The following chapter is not meant to be an exhaustive description of all elements of the nuclear weapons budget or the budget process. Rather, it will discuss the main points of disagreement over fiscal issues between nuclear weapons critics and supporters; clarify why it is difficult to reach widespread agreement, inside and outside government, on how much the nation spends on its nuclear arsenal; and provide illustrations of the existing complications of nuclear weapons budgeting. Two broad issues are the main reason for disagreement regarding the costs of nuclear weapons-related expenditures. One is the dual nature of many programs
within the nuclear enterprise. For example, what portions of a nuclear-capable bomber crew’s recruitment, training, and maintenance should be included in the nuclear weapons budget when almost all bombers fly mostly conventional missions? How should the Departments of Energy and Defense account for the costs of nuclear science projects that may not only benefit the nation’s nuclear weapons program but many other unrelated scientific efforts, such as the National Ignition Facility? Should the cost of advancing general science be counted toward the nuclear weapons budget? How about the cost of building national security science facilities-that work on nuclear weapons-related research most of the time? The correct answer to these and similar questions is at the heart of some disagreements between critics of the nuclear arsenal and its advocates. The second issue that complicates nuclear weapons budgeting is a disagreement over the definition of nuclear weapons modernization. The US is not developing new nuclear warheads but is extending the service-lives of currently deployed warheads: W78 and W87 for the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile, W-76-0/1 and W88 for the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, the B61 family of nuclear warheads for the dual-capable aircraft and B-2/B-52 bombers, and the W-80-1 air-launched cruise missile for the B-52. Over the next few decades, the administration’s stockpile plan is to maintain three interoperable ballistic missile warheads and two interoperable air carrier warheads-all while the US needs to recapitalize its nuclear weapons delivery platforms (bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, longrange standoff weapons, and both the ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles they carry) over the next two decades. This requires planning and investing resources now-while making the nuclear posture decisions that will impact national security. A second point of contention between critics and advocates of the arsenal is whether life extension programs (LEPs) count toward nuclear weapons modernization even though no new nuclear weapons are produced. The answer to this question largely depends on whether one is a critic or an advocate of modernization programs. Given the two distinctly different views held by critics and advocates of the nuclear arsenal, the remainder of this chapter attempts to illuminate some of these important issues by first offering the arguments advanced by critics, followed by the arguments advanced by advocates. The chapter concludes with a set of recommendations we believe will ensure the nation’s nuclear deterrent capability will remain credible for many years to come.
